They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.
Members of Congress are to be paid for their work from the U. There was some doubt about treating obvious offences against the Parliament as contempts because the particular immunity which they violated was not readily apparent. For example, the unauthorised publication of in camera evidence is clearly an offence, but which particular immunity does it violate?
Similarly, it is sometimes said that because the Houses of the British Parliament resolved in the 18th century that reporting of their proceedings was a breach of privilege i. This misconception also stems from the confusion between immunities and powers. Section 49 of the Constitution confers upon the Houses of the Australian Parliament power to declare acts to be offences and to punish those acts; it does not mean that acts which have been declared to be contempts in the United Kingdom are automatically contempts in Australia.
Since the Australian Houses have not declared reporting of their proceedings to be a contempt, the resolutions of the British Houses are of no consequence, and the problem simply does not arise in Australia. This confusion between immunities and powers is still so deeply entrenched in much discussion of parliamentary immunities and powers that it is very difficult to avoid it.
The matter is discussed more fully in the House of Commons report, 4 in the Senate submission to the joint committee, and in various advices to, and reports by, the Senate Privileges Committee. In Australia parliamentary immunities and powers are part of the ordinary law by virtue of section 49 of the Constitution.
The only way in which the Houses can definitely alter their immunities or powers is by passing legislation, as authorised by that section. The courts uphold parliamentary immunities by preventing any violation of those immunities in the course of proceedings before the courts, and they uphold parliamentary powers, especially the power to punish contempts, in any test of the legality of the exercise of those powers.
This reflects the evolution of the law in the United Kingdom. The law in respect of the immunities and powers of the Houses of the British Parliament was originally formulated by the two Houses.
They also claimed to be the only courts which could interpret and apply that law. The ordinary courts rejected this claim, and maintained that the law of parliamentary immunities and powers was part of the ordinary law and could be interpreted and applied by the courts.
There were some famous clashes between the Houses and the courts resulting from this difference of view. After the middle of the 19th century, however, the Houses tacitly abandoned their claim and acquiesced in the view of the courts that the law is indivisible. For their part, the courts accepted and adopted the law as it had been expounded by the Houses. It is now regarded as firmly established in Britain that parliamentary immunities and powers are part of the ordinary law and are interpreted and upheld by the courts.
In a few rare cases in recent times the British House of Commons has determined the extent of parliamentary immunities. One instance was the Strauss case in , in which the House decided, contrary to the finding of its Committee of Privileges, that the writing of a letter to a minister was not included in proceedings in Parliament. Had the question been determined in court, the court might have taken a different view; if a court had made the decision, it would have been binding as a matter of law, unless overturned by a higher court.
The law of parliamentary immunities and powers is therefore not different from other branches of the law. Law and parliamentary practice, however, are distinct. The Senate's Privilege Resolutions, for example, which regulate the practices of the Senate in relation to privilege matters, are not part of the law and are not subject to interpretation or application by the courts. This term refers to a claim of the executive government to be immune from being required to present certain documents or information to the courts or to the Houses of Parliament.
The courts have determined the law of executive privilege in respect of the courts, but only the Houses of Parliament can determine whether they admit the existence of such a privilege in relation to documents or information required by the Houses, or whether they will insist upon the production of documents and information which they require.
The Senate has not conceded the existence of any conclusive executive privilege in relation to its proceedings. The matter is more fully discussed in Chapter 19, Relations with the Executive Government, under public interest immunity. The immunity of parliamentary proceedings from impeachment and question in the courts is the only immunity of substance possessed by the Houses and their members and committees.
There are two aspects of the immunity. First, there is the immunity from civil or criminal action and examination in legal proceedings of members of the Houses and of witnesses and others taking part in proceedings in Parliament. This immunity is usually known as the right of freedom of speech in Parliament. Secondly, there is the immunity of parliamentary proceedings as such from impeachment or question in the courts.
This immunity is in essence a safeguard of the separation of powers: it prevents the other two branches of government, the executive and the judiciary, calling into question or inquiring into the proceedings of the legislature. Members of the Houses and other participants in proceedings in Parliament, such as witnesses giving evidence before committees, are immune from all impeachment or question in the courts for their contributions to proceedings in Parliament.
As those contributions consist mainly of speaking in debate in the Houses and speaking in committee proceedings, this immunity has the significant effect that members and witnesses cannot be prosecuted or sued for anything they say in those forums. Thus the common designation of the immunity as freedom of speech. It has long been regarded as absolutely essential if the Houses of the Parliament are to be able to debate and to inquire utterly fearlessly for the public good. The immunity has a wider scope, however, and a question of interpretation of that wider scope led to the statutory declaration and codification of the immunity which is outlined below.
The other important effect of the immunity is that the courts may not inquire into or question proceedings in Parliament as such.
The courts will not invalidate legislative or other decisions of the Houses on the grounds that the Houses did not properly adhere to their own procedures, nor will they grant relief to persons claiming to be disadvantaged by the improper application of those procedures. Even where a statutory provision relates to parliamentary procedure, such as the provisions for the disallowance of delegated legislation in Commonwealth statutes, the courts have held that specified procedural steps are not mandatory.
The immunity is modified in Australia by constitutional law: where the Constitution provides that certain parliamentary procedures must take place for legislation to be validly enacted, as in section 57 of the Constitution, the High Court will inquire and determine whether those procedures have been properly carried out to determine the validity of the resulting legislation.
The immunity of parliamentary proceedings from question in the courts is regarded as necessary for the two Houses to carry out their functions without the fear of their proceedings being restricted or regulated by actions in the courts. In the United Kingdom the immunity was given a statutory form in the Bill of Rights of , which has been interpreted and applied by the courts in a number of cases. That body of law became part of the law in Australia by virtue of section 49 of the Constitution.
The provision has been interpreted, however, as conferring a wide immunity on members in respect of their participation in legislative activities. Congressional witnesses are granted certain immunities by legislation, but they may be prosecuted for perjury.
Immunity of parliamentary proceedings from scrutiny in the courts was formerly supported by a parliamentary practice of not allowing reference to the records of those proceedings in the courts without the approval of the House concerned. This practice was sometimes mistakenly regarded as the full extent of the immunity which it was designed to protect.
Because in recent times the courts have usually been scrupulous to observe the law and to refrain from questioning parliamentary proceedings, the practice was unnecessary, and was abolished by the Senate in see below. As a residual safeguard, however, senators and Senate officers are required to seek the approval of the Senate before giving evidence in respect of proceedings of the Senate or a Senate committee. The Parliamentary Privileges Act was enacted primarily to settle a disagreement between the Senate and the Supreme Court of New South Wales over the scope of freedom of speech in Parliament as provided by article 9 of the Bill of Rights of Article 9 is part of the law of Australia and applies to the Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament by virtue of section 49 of the Constitution.
The famous article declares:. That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament. Two judgments by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in and interpreted and applied the article in a manner unacceptable to the Parliament.
The question which gave rise to these judgments was whether witnesses who gave evidence before a parliamentary committee could subsequently be examined on that evidence in the course of a criminal trial. The case in question was R v Murphy , 13 involving the prosecution of a justice of the High Court for attempting to pervert the course of justice. The principal prosecution witnesses in the two trials had given evidence before select committees of the Senate, which had conducted inquiries to ascertain whether the justice should be removed from office by parliamentary address under section 72 of the Constitution.
The view taken by the Senate, which submitted its claim to the trial judges, was as follows. Evidence as to what the witnesses or the accused said before the Senate committees could be admitted for the purpose of establishing some material fact, such as the fact that a person gave evidence before a committee at a particular time, if that fact were relevant in the trials.
The evidence put before the committees could not be used in the trials for the purpose of supporting the prosecution or the defence, nor particularly for attacking the evidence of the witnesses or the accused whether given before the committees or before the court.
This view of the effect of article 9 was based upon history and judicial authority. The claim of Parliament to exclude the courts from examination of parliamentary proceedings was historically closely linked with another claim, namely, that the courts should have no jurisdiction over that part of the law relating to parliamentary privilege.
That claim has long since been abandoned by the British Parliament, and constitutionally could not even be pretended by the Australian Houses, but it is not the same immunity as is asserted in article 9 and is not an essential foundation of the article, which establishes a very broad immunity of parliamentary proceedings from examination in the courts.
The Senate's interpretation of article 9 was supported by a number of judgments which, while not dealing explicitly with the question of the examination of witnesses on their parliamentary evidence, gave weight to the interpretation urged by the Senate.
The judgments in Britain and in Australia were consistent. In Dingle's case 16 it was held that it was not permissible to impugn the validity of the report of a select committee in court proceedings. In the Scientology case 17 it was held that the privilege of freedom of speech was not limited to the exclusion of any cause of action in respect of what was said or done in Parliament, but prohibited the examination of parliamentary proceedings for the purpose of supporting a cause of action arising from something outside of those proceedings.
In R v Secretary of State for Trade ; Ex parte Anderson Strathclyde plc [] 2 All ER it was held that what was said in Parliament could not be used to support an application for relief in respect of something done outside Parliament. In the Comalco case 18 it was held that, while evidence of what occurred in Parliament is not inadmissible as such, a court has a duty to ensure that the substance of what was said in Parliament is not the subject of any submission or inference.
These judgments, and others, indicated that article 9 prevents proceedings in Parliament being used to support an action or being questioned in a very wide sense. There were two questions which might have been thought to be still unanswered in the interpretation of article 9.
The first was whether evidence given by witnesses before a parliamentary committee receives the same protection as statements made by members in debate in Parliament. In R v Wainscot 1 WALR 77 it was held that a witness's evidence before a committee is not admissible against the witness in subsequent proceedings, and in Goffin v Donnelly 6 QBD it was held that an action for slander could not lie in respect of statements made in evidence before a committee.
This question was not raised in the proceedings in R v Murphy ; the parliamentary claim that the evidence of witnesses is part of parliamentary proceedings was not questioned in the submissions or in the judgments. The other question was whether some distinction could be drawn between evidence given by a defendant and the evidence given by witnesses.
It might have been thought that a defendant, being the person in peril, civilly or criminally, in court proceedings, was perhaps more entitled to the protection of not having statements made before a committee used by the plaintiff or prosecution than those who were merely witnesses in the court proceedings.
This interpretation was put forward by the defendant in both trials: it was claimed that the defence could examine prosecution witnesses on their parliamentary evidence for the purpose of attacking their court evidence, but that the parliamentary evidence could not be used against the defendant.
This interpretation was rejected not only by the Houses but by the judges in both judgments, and no such distinction was drawn. The effect of both judgments in R v Murphy was that the prosecution and the defence made free use of the evidence given before the Senate committees for their respective purposes. The defendant and the prosecution witnesses were subjected to severe attacks using their committee evidence, attacks not only on their court evidence, but on the truthfulness of, and the motives underlying, their committee evidence.
In this process the prosecution and the defence made use of evidence given in camera that is, not in public before the Senate committees, evidence which neither the committees nor the Senate had published or disclosed to them, and which, in the view of the Senate, they had no right even to possess. This use of the parliamentary evidence was allowed by both judgments. In the first judgment Mr Justice Cantor proposed that the rationale of article 9 was to prevent harm being done to Parliament and its proceedings, and that this rationale provided a test to determine the use which could be made of evidence of parliamentary proceedings.
He also appeared to consider that, in the application of this test, the importance of the evidence to the court proceedings should be weighed against the privilege of freedom of speech, so that the latter would not be an absolute prohibition but a consideration to be balanced against the requirements of the court proceedings.
He also appeared to consider that this reasoning was not inconsistent with the previous judgments. In the second judgment Mr Justice Hunt held that article 9 was restricted to preventing parliamentary proceedings being the actual cause of an action, but did not prevent evidence of those proceedings being used to support an action, either in providing primary evidence of an offence or a civil wrong, or in providing a basis for attacking the evidence of a witness or a defendant in the court proceedings.
This reasoning was based upon an interpretation of the legislative purpose of article 9 and on a finding of the proper scope of parliamentary privilege as it relates to court proceedings, and explicitly declined to follow the earlier judgments cited.
The reasoning of the judges was not accepted by the Senate, and was criticised in documents laid before that House by its President. The judgments, even in the absence of statutory correction, did not represent the law. It was unlikely that they would be followed by other courts, and subsequently there were contradictory judgments, including one by another judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
Remarks made by him in the New South Wales Parliament were highly relevant to the case and the prosecution attempted to use them to assist in establishing his guilty motive and intention.
The question of parliamentary privilege was argued again by the New South Wales Legislative Assembly, and the judge upheld the previously established interpretation of freedom of speech and declined to allow the admission of the statements made in Parliament. In doing so he explicitly rejected the reasons of Hunt J. In R v Saffron , however, the District Court allowed in camera evidence of a select committee of the NSW Legislative Assembly to be subpoenaed and made available for the use of the defence.
The judge went so far as to suggest that the repetition outside Parliament by a member of the member's statements in Parliament was also privileged. The erroneous New South Wales judgments were partly founded on several misconceptions about the nature of parliamentary privilege, for example, that the traditional interpretation would have it restrict any public criticism of parliamentary proceedings.
The Parliamentary Privileges Act , unprecedented in being introduced by the President of the Senate, was enacted for the express purpose of overturning the adverse court judgments. It made use of the legislative power under section 49 of the Constitution to enact the traditional interpretation of article 9. The statutory declaration of the formerly established scope of freedom of speech was accomplished, in section 16 of the Act, in several stages.
The first stage made it clear that the Australian Houses possessed the privilege of freedom of speech in the terms of the Bill of Rights:. These terms were used because the Parliament was not legislating to provide for its freedom of speech in the future, but declaring what its freedom of speech had always been.
The Houses did not wish to give any credence to the reading down of article 9, especially as the article is part of the law of other jurisdictions, including the Australian states. The provision is thus intended to cover past proceedings in Parliament, although, as will be seen, any intention to legislate with retrospective effect for court proceedings already commenced was disclaimed.
This was done in the following terms:. The relevant provision does not explicitly declare that members or witnesses may not be prosecuted or sued for their participation in parliamentary proceedings: that was regarded as beyond doubt and clearly provided by the terms of article 9.
By its terms, however, the provision effectively prevents prosecution or suit for proceedings in Parliament. The provision indicates the wider operation of the article and draws the line between the proper and improper admission of evidence of parliamentary proceedings, in accordance with the principles set out above:. Paragraph a expresses the principal prohibition contained in article 9. It prevents, for example, a statement in debate by a member of Parliament or the evidence of a parliamentary witness being directly attacked for the purpose of court proceedings, or the motives of the member or the witness in speaking in Parliament or giving evidence being impugned.
Thus, it cannot be submitted that a member's statements in Parliament were not true, or reckless, to support a submission that the member is an untruthful, or reckless, person. Paragraph b prevents the use of proceedings in Parliament to attack the credibility, motives or intentions of a person even where this does not directly call into question those proceedings. This would prevent, for example, members' speeches in debate or parliamentary witnesses' evidence being used to establish their motives or intention for the purpose of supporting a criminal or civil action against them, or against another person.
Thus a member's statements outside Parliament cannot be shown to be motivated by malice by reference to a member's statements in Parliament. Paragraph c is intended to prevent the indirect or circuitous use of parliamentary proceedings to support a cause of action. This would prevent, for example, a jury being invited to infer matters from speeches in debate by members of Parliament or from evidence of parliamentary witnesses in the course of a criminal or civil action against them or another person.
Thus a member's speech in Parliament cannot be used to support an inference that the member's conduct outside Parliament was part of some illegal activity. It is intended that this would not prevent the proving of a material fact by reference to a record of proceedings in Parliament which establishes that fact, for example, the tendering of the Journals of the Senate to prove that a Senator was present in the Senate on a particular day.
This provision is not infringed by the tendering of committee evidence to a court where no inferences are to be drawn from that evidence. In any case, it is permitted for the purpose of proving that a report of the proceedings is a fair and accurate report. The provision also prevents relying on parliamentary proceedings for the prohibited purposes. This was thought to follow necessarily from the principle that parliamentary proceedings cannot be used to support a cause of action.
The next provision prevents absolutely the admission in court proceedings of any evidence relating to parliamentary evidence taken in camera:. This provision arises from the use by the prosecution and the defence in R v Murphy of transcripts of evidence taken in camera before one of the Senate committees and not subsequently published by the committee or the Senate.
Subsection 5 provides that in relation to proceedings in a court or tribunal so far as they relate to a question arising under section 57 of the Constitution or the interpretation of a statute, neither the Act nor the Bill of Rights shall be taken to restrict the admission in evidence of an authorised record of proceedings in Parliament or the making of statements, submissions or comments based on that record.
This provision ensures that the section does not prevent courts examining parliamentary proceedings for the purposes of ascertaining the parliamentary intention in relation to the interpretation of a statute or of determining constitutional questions arising from disagreements between the two Houses.
Subsection 6 provides that parliamentary proceedings may be examined in court proceedings in relation to an offence concerning parliamentary proceedings. The Parliamentary Privileges Act itself, and some other Commonwealth statutes, 24 create criminal offences, which may be prosecuted through the courts, for improper activities in relation to parliamentary proceedings, offences which, in the absence of the statutory provisions, could be dealt with only by the Houses as contempts of Parliament.
Penalties are provided for such offences as the unauthorised publication of in camera evidence and improper influencing of parliamentary witnesses. Because the successful prosecution of such offences may well require the examination of proceedings in Parliament, it was necessary to make another exception in respect of them.
This provision illustrates a difficulty. By enacting criminal remedies to protect its proceedings, the Parliament, in effect, and, it may be said, unwittingly, has made an inroad on the immunity of its proceedings from question in the courts. The first such inroad was made by the British Parliament with a statute of for the protection of its witnesses. Thus, in order to prosecute successfully the offence of tampering with a witness, it may well be necessary to adduce the witness's evidence and to draw an inference from that evidence as to whether the witness was improperly influenced.
As a matter of fairness, it may then be necessary to allow the defence to examine the witness's evidence and to call it into question for the purposes of the defence. This is a significant modification of the immunity as it had previously been understood. Finally, the Houses disclaimed the intention of legislating retrospectively for proceedings on foot:. The effect of this provision was that, if some courts had persisted in interpreting article 9 narrowly, the Act applied only to future court proceedings, but to any use of any parliamentary proceedings.
The bill for the Act having been presented in the terms outlined, some senators were concerned that it was too widely drafted, and might be unduly restrictive of the rights of litigants and defendants. The question was not whether the bill actually represented the traditional established interpretation of article 9, but whether that interpretation might itself be unduly restrictive. This concern soon focused on the question of whether litigants and defendants should be able to make limited use of evidence given before parliamentary committees for the purposes of their court proceedings.
There was no thought of speeches by members in Parliament being subjected to any examination in court, but there was a concern that the particular circumstances of the Murphy trials, where the accused and the principal witnesses had given evidence before parliamentary committees on the same matters as in their court evidence, might recur. Consideration was given to including in the relevant clause of the bill an exception which would allow a person who had given evidence before a parliamentary committee to be cross-examined in court on that evidence for the purpose of showing that the person's parliamentary and court evidence was inconsistent and that the person's court evidence was therefore unreliable.
Such a use of parliamentary evidence, which would not involve questioning that evidence as such but merely comparing it with evidence given in court for the purpose of making submissions as to the reliability of the court evidence, might preserve the rights of litigants to the extent necessary and prevent any injustice which could be worked by the bill.
Normally a witness can be cross-examined in relation to inconsistent prior statements, and evidence of inconsistent prior statements can be tendered. This question of whether an exception should be made in the coverage of clause 16 to allow limited examination of a person's parliamentary evidence was considered during the bill's passage, and the conclusion was reached that it would be impossible to make such an exception without undermining the whole principle of the bill.
There are strong arguments in support of that conclusion. In the first place, such an amendment would draw a distinction between evidence given before a parliamentary committee and other proceedings in Parliament, such as speeches or questions by members. It would create an anomalous situation whereby parliamentary evidence would be subject to examination in court but other proceedings in Parliament would not.
Another difficulty with such an amendment has already been suggested. If one party in a civil or criminal action were allowed to seek to undermine the evidence of a witness by using the witness's parliamentary evidence, as a matter of fairness the other party in the proceedings would have to be allowed to try to rebut that undermining of the witness's evidence by further use of the parliamentary proceedings. For example, if the defence in a criminal case were allowed to try to demonstrate that a witness's parliamentary evidence was inconsistent with the witness's court evidence, the prosecution would have to be allowed to try to rebut that contention, perhaps by showing that the questioning of the witness before the parliamentary committee was misleading or biased, or that the witness was not given proper opportunity to respond to questions put in the committee.
This would open the way to the very impeaching and questioning of parliamentary proceedings which it is the aim of article 9 and the legislation to prevent.
Whenever a witness in court proceedings has given evidence or made any statement on the same subject in another forum, it is possible for counsel to claim that the prior evidence or statement was inconsistent with the court evidence, and to attack the witness on that basis.
The possibility of such an attack on a witness is often dependent on accidental circumstances, such as the witness having made comments to the press before the legal proceedings. The whole purpose of the legislation being to prevent people being attacked on the basis of their participation in proceedings in Parliament, it was considered neither just nor desirable that witnesses should be subject to attack because they had previously given evidence to a parliamentary committee, perhaps under compulsion.
Parliamentary committees are not bound by the rules of evidence. A parliamentary witness, perhaps under compulsion, may be asked to express the witness's opinions, feelings, suspicions and doubts, and to give self-incriminating evidence.
It would be unfair to allow a witness subsequently to be attacked in court proceedings on the basis of this evidence, which would not otherwise be admissible in the court proceedings. Statements made in the course of parliamentary proceedings should be considered to be in the same category as statements subject to other forms of privilege recognised by the law. An example is legal professional privilege. A person may have made an inconsistent statement in communication with the person's legal adviser, but such a statement is privileged and the person cannot be cross-examined on it.
The rationale of this legal professional privilege has been stated as follows:. The unrestricted communication between parties and their professional advisers has been considered of such importance as to make it advisable to protect it even by the concealment of matter without the discovery of which the truth of the case cannot be ascertained. Similar considerations apply in relation to what used to be called Crown or executive privilege.
The freedom to speak frankly and freely in the course of parliamentary proceedings and the giving of parliamentary evidence should be considered of such importance as to give it the same absolute privilege. Any injustice which might otherwise be caused by the exclusion of evidence protected by parliamentary privilege may be remedied by the court ordering a stay of proceedings. The validity of section 16 of the Act was challenged in the Federal Court in Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth 19 FCR , but the judge found the Act to be a valid and clear declaration of the previous law.
The latter judgment rejected the arguments, mooted in academic circles, that parliamentary privilege as explicated in the Act is inconsistent with the separation of the legislative and judicial powers or the implied right of freedom of political communication in the Constitution. Contrary to academic misconception, findings by a court, on evidence lawfully before it, which indirectly call into question parliamentary proceedings for example, a finding that a statement outside parliamentary proceedings was false, which would mean that a similar statement in the course of parliamentary proceedings was also false , are not prevented by parliamentary privilege.
In a judgment in a defamation case, Laurance v Katter [] 1 Qd R , two judges of the Queensland Court of Appeal appeared to conclude that section 16 of the Act should be either read down or found invalid in order to allow a statement in the House of Representatives to be used to support an action for defamation.
Settlement of this case in prevented a pending review by the High Court. This judgment is incoherent and not authoritative. It has already been noted that, although the relevant provision in the United States Constitution is narrower in scope, it has been interpreted as conferring a wide immunity on the legislative activities of members. This supports the contention that the broad interpretation contained in the Act is appropriate for the protection of the legislative activities of the Australian Houses.
The Act did not explicitly extend the immunity of freedom of speech to activities of members not related to their participation in proceedings of the Houses and committees. This reflected a considered view that the extension of the immunity to such matters is not warranted. Constitution, was written before the First Amendment and has a more limited scope. The general purpose of the speech and debate clause is to protect members of Congress from having to worry that anything they say in the course of legislative activities will implicate them in a lawsuit.
In United States v. Brewster , U. In Gravel v. It refused to extend the privilege to the subsequent publication of materials read in congressional debates — in this case the Pentagon Papers.
In Hutchinson v. Proxmire , the Court permitted a defamation suit against a senator for derogatory comments made in a newsletter and in forums other than the Senate floor. In Office of Senator Dayton v.
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